Weak coin flipping is among the fundamental cryptographic primitives which ensure the security of modern communication networks. It allows two mistrustful parties to remotely agree on a random bit when they favor opposite outcomes. Unlike other two-party computations, one can achieve information-theoretic security using quantum mechanics only: both parties are prevented from biasing the flip with probability higher than 1/2 + , where is arbitrarily low. Classically, the dishonest party can always cheat with probability 1 unless computational assumptions are used. Despite its importance, no physical implementation has been proposed for quantum weak coin flipping. Here, we present a practical protocol that requires a single photon and linear optics only. We show that it is fair and balanced even when threshold single-photon detectors are used, and reaches a bias as low as = 1/ √ 2 − 1/2 ≈ 0.207. We further show that the protocol may display quantum advantage over a few hundred meters with state-of-the-art technology.
Modern communication networks are continuously expanding, as the number of users and available online resources increases. On a daily basis, users must inevitably trust local network nodes and transmission channels in order to perform sensitive tasks such as private data transmission, online banking, electronic voting, delegated computing and many more. A complex network can be secured by relying on a collection of simpler cryptographic primitives, or building blocks, which are combined to guarantee overall security. Strong coin flipping (SCF) is one of such primitives, in which two parties remotely agree on a random bit such that none of the parties can bias the outcome with probability higher than 1/2 + , where is the protocol bias. SCF is fundamental in multiparty computation [1] , online gaming and more general randomized consensus protocols involving leader election [2] .
Weak coin flipping (WCF) is a version of coin flipping in which both parties have a preferred, opposite outcome: it effectively designates a winner and a loser. In the classical world, informationtheoretically secure SCF and WCF are impossible: they require computational assumptions or trusting a third party [3] [4] [5] [6] . Using quantum properties, on the other hand, enables information-theoretically secure SCF and WCF: the lowest possible bias for quantum SCF is = 1/ √ 2 − 1/2 [9] , while quantum WCF may achieve a bias arbitrarily close to zero [10, 11] . Remarkably, quantum WCF is also involved in the construction of optimal quantum SCF and quantum bit commitment schemes [7, 8] . Although the works from [10, 11] proved the existence of quantum WCF protocols achieving arbitrarily low biases, no explicit protocol had been provided. In 2002, two explicit protocols with small biases were proposed: the work from [12] achieved ≈ 0.239, while [13] achieved = 1/ √ 2 − 1/2 ≈ 0.207, which is incidentally the SCF lower bound. Later, it was shown that the scheme from [13] in fact belonged to a larger family of WCF protocols with = 1/6 ≈ 0.167 [14, 15] . Very recently, a new explicit family of protocols achieved ≈ 1/10 [16] , followed by arbitrarily low biases [17] .
While quantum SCF protocols have been experimentally demonstrated [18] [19] [20] , no implementation has been proposed for quantum WCF. This may be explained by two reasons. First, it is difficult to find an encoding and implementation which is robust to losses: a dishonest party may always declare an abort when they are not satisfied with the flip's outcome. Second, none of the previously mentioned protocols translate trivially into a simple experiment: they involve performing single-shot generalized measurements [13] or generating beyond-qubit states [12] .
In this Letter, we introduce a family of quantum WCF protocols, inspired by [13] , which achieve biases as low as = 1/ √ 2 − 1/2 ≈ 0.207. These protocols involve simple projective measurements instead of generalized ones, require a single photon and linear optics only, and need at most three rounds of communication between the parties. The information is encoded by mixing the single photon with vacuum on an unbalanced beam splitter, which generates entanglement [21] : both parties may then agree on a random bit, while the entanglement is simultaneously verified. This encoding is very robust to noise, as the single photon need not be pure or indistinguishable from other photons in any degree of freedom, save photon number. We also use a version of our schemes to construct a quantum SCF protocol with bias ≈ 0.31. We further derive a practical security proof for both number-resolving and threshold single-photon detectors, considering the extension to infinite Hilbert spaces. Since the presence of losses arXiv:2002.09005v1 [quant-ph] 20 Feb 2020 may enable classical protocols to reach lower cheating probabilities than quantum protocols, we finally show that our fair and balanced quantum protocol bears no classical equivalent over a few hundred meters of lossy optical fiber and non-unit detection efficiency.
Protocol.-In the honest protocol, Alice and Bob wish to toss a fair coin, with a priori knowledge that they each favor opposite outcomes. Fig. 1 represents the implementation of the honest protocol, which follows five distinct steps. Defining x ∈ [0, 1 2 ] as a free protocol parameter, these read:
• Alice mixes a single photon with the vacuum on a beam splitter of reflectivity x.
• Alice keeps the first half of the state obtained, and sends the second half to Bob.
• Bob mixes the half he receives with the vacuum on a beam splitter of reflectivity y = 1 − 1 2(1−x) .
• Bob measures the second register of his state with a single-photon detector, and broadcasts the outcome c ∈ {0, 1}.
• The last step is a verification step, which splits into two cases. If c = 0, Alice sends her half of the state to Bob, who mixes it with his half on a beam splitter of reflectivity z = 2x. He then measures the two output modes with singlephoton detectors. He declares Alice the winner if the outcome (1, 0) is obtained. If c = 1: Bob discards his half, and Alice measures her half with a single-photon detector. If the outcome is (0), Bob is declared winner.
Correctness.-We show that the protocol is fair, i.e. that the probability of winning for each party is 1 2 when they are both honest. Single photons are quantized excitations of the electromagnetic field, which are described by the action of the creation operator onto the vacuum. Beam splitters act linearly on creation operators, and leave invariant the vacuum. Hence, the evolution of the quantum state over the three modes up to Bob's measurement reads:
where the notation (t), kl indicates the reflectivity of the beam splitter and the corresponding spatial modes. Hence, the probability that Bob obtains outcome c = 1 when measuring the third register is P (1) = (1−x)(1−y), while the probability of outcome c = 0 is P (0) = 1 − P (1 ensures P (0) = P (1) = 1 2 . When c = 1, the state on modes 1 and 2 is projected onto |00 , while c = 0 projects the state onto √ 2x |10 + √ 1 − 2x |01 . In the first case, the measurement performed by Alice outputs (0) with probability 1. In the second case, the measurement performed by Bob outputs (1, 0) with probability 1. Hence, the probability that Alice (resp. Bob) wins is directly given by P (1)). This shows that the protocol is fair, since P (0) = P (1) = 1 2 . Security.-We now derive the security of the protocol. Namely, we obtain the probabilities of winning when Bob is dishonest and Alice is honest, and vice versa.
Dishonest Bob should always declare the outcome c = 1 in order to maximize his winning probability. The outcome of the coin flip is then confirmed if Alice obtains the outcome 0 upon verification. Bob thus needs to maximize the probability of the outcome 0, applying a general quantum operation to his half of the state. However, the probability that the detector clicks is independent of Bob's action. It is given by x, so that Bob's winning probability is upper bounded by (1 − x) . This upper bound is reached if Bob discards his half of the state and broadcasts c = 1. Then, Bob's optimal cheating probability is P
Alice wins when Bob declares c = 0 and the out-come of his quantum measurement is (1, 0) . The most general strategy of dishonest Alice is to send a (mixed) state σ, while Bob performs the rest of the protocol honestly. We find that the security is derived easily if Bob is allowed photon number resolving detectors (see Appendix II for details of all the proofs). Remarkably, the protocol is still secure even when Bob only uses threshold detectors, which is essential to the practicality of the protocol. Moreover, Alice's optimal cheating probability remains the same in both cases: P
In particular, for all values of x, we retrieve the property shared by the protocols of [13] : P
2 . The underlying idea in the security analysis for threshold and number resolving detectors is that Alice must generate the state which maximizes the overlap with Bob's projectors |100 100| and ∞ n=1 |n00 n00|, respectively. Setting x = 1 − 1/ √ 2, we obtain a version of the protocol which is balanced, i.e. both players have the same cheating probability 1/ √ 2. The protocol bias is then = 1/ √ 2 − 1/2 ≈ 0.207. Moreover, following [7] , we show in Appendix III that a suitable choice of parameters x,y,z yielding an unbalanced quantum WCF protocol allows to construct a quantum SCF protocol with bias ≈ 0.31.
Fault tolerance: noise.-We now investigate how imperfect state generation, non-ideal beam splitters and single-photon detector dark counts affect the correctness and security of the protocol. While we fixed the parameter values to y = 1 − 1 2(1−x) and z = 2x in the ideal setting, we now allow the three parameters x, y, z to vary freely.
The vacuum/single-photon encoding is very robust to noise, in comparison to polarization or phase encoding for instance: the only property that must be preserved through propagation is photon number. This implies that photon indistinguishability and purity are not required in any degree of freedom other than photon number. In this case, Alice may simply produce a heralded single photon via spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) [22] , which generates a photon pair: one may be used for the flip, while the other may herald the presence of the first one. Given the photon-pair emission probability p, accidentally emitting two pairs at the same time using SPDC occurs with probability p 2 . Since p may be arbitrarily tuned by changing the pump power, p 2and therefore the probability of two photons being accidentally generated by Alice at once-may then be decreased to negligible values.
Note that, in the case where Alice's single photon source is probabilistic but heralded (as in SPDC), she may always inform Bob of a successful state generation prior to his announcement of c without compromising security. In what follows, we may therefore assume that both parties have agreed on the presence of an initial state, and hence know when the protocol occurs.
Noise will therefore stem from the non-ideal reflectivities of the beam splitters, and the non-zero detector dark count probability p dc . For each party, these may affect the protocol correctness in two ways: an undesired bias of the flip, and an added abort probability during the verification process.
Deviations on the beam splitter reflectivities x, y, and z will first change the honest winning probabilities: these may be re-calculated by replacing the ideal reflectivity r ∈ {x, y} with an imperfect r . As regards to honest aborts, a beam splitter with reflectivity z instead of z may be applied on the resulting state when c = 0. Noisy detectors may cause an unwanted abort corresponding to a click because of dark counts. However, with superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors, this probability is typically very low, of the order of p dc < 10 −8 [23] .
We can therefore conclude that any source of noise may be incorporated in the security analysis by simply replacing parameters x, y, and z with x , y , and z . Furthermore, this source of error will most likely be negligible with current technology. We therefore solely focus on the more consequential effects of losses.
Fault tolerance: losses.-Losses can be due to the channel transmission and to non-unit delay line transmission and detection efficiencies. We label η t the transmission efficiency of the quantum channel from Alice to Bob. We also define as η Here, we assume the efficiencies of Bob's detectors to be the same, and that each party introduces a fiber delay whenever they are waiting for the other party's communication. The delay time therefore depends on the distance between the two parties.
In the presence of losses, the protocol may also abort when both parties are honest, when the photon is lost. We derive in Appendix IV the expressions for the two honest winning probabilities P
h , and hence the probability P ab of abort, in the presence of losses:
(2) Note that the overall correctness does not depend on Alice's detection efficiency η Security in the presence of losses.-Dishonest Bob's best strategy is to perform the same attack as in the lossless case, because he has no control over Alice's half of the subsystem. His winning probability is then P
However, in a more general game-theoretic scenario, Bob's best strategy will in fact depend on the rewards and sanctions associated with honest aborts and "getting caught cheating" aborts. In other words, Bob has to minimize his risk-to-reward ratio. Maximizing his winning probability makes him run the risk of getting caught cheating with probability xη
Dishonest Alice must still generate the state which maximizes the (1, 0, 0) outcome on Bob's detectors after his honest transformations have been applied. However, the expression for Bob's corresponding projector now changes, as there is a finite probability (1 − η (B) d ) n that the n-photon component is projected onto the vacuum. The 0 outcome on one spatial mode is therefore triggered by the projection
The total projector responsible for the (1, 0, 0) outcome then reads
(3) The value of the upper bound on the right hand side is Alice's cheating probability in the lossless case. This shows that Alice cannot take advantage of Bob's imperfect detectors or his lossy delay line in order to increase her cheating probability. We now provide a sketch of the proof: since passive linear optical elements act linearly on creation operators, equal losses on different modes may be commuted through the interferometer of the protocol. This allows to upper bound Alice's maximum winning probability by her winning probability in an equivalent picture in which the losses happen just after her state preparation, then followed by a lossless protocol. In that case, it is as if dishonest Alice was trying to cheat in the lossless protocol, while being restricted to lossy state preparation instead of ideal state preparation.
Practical protocol performance.-We now analyze the performance of our protocol in a practical setting, by enforcing three conditions on the free parameters: the protocol must be fair, balanced, and perform strictly better than any classical protocol. The latter condition is not required in an ideal implementation, since quantum WCF always provides a security advantage over classical WCF. Allowing for abort cases, however, may enable some classical protocols to per-FIG. 2: Practical quantum advantage for a fair and balanced protocol. Numerical values for the lowest classical and quantum cheating probabilities, P C d and P Q d , are plotted as a function of distance d in blue and red, respectively. Honest abort probability P ab (responsible for P Q d being lower than our ideal quantum cheating probability 1/ √ 2) is plotted in magenta. Our quantum protocol performs strictly better than any classical protocol when P
where η s is the fiber delay transmission corresponding to 500ns of optical switching form better than quantum ones. This is because increasing the abort probability effectively decreases Alice and Bob's cheating probabilities. We say that the protocol allows for quantum advantage when it provides a strictly lower cheating probability than any classical protocol with the same abort probability. This is obtained using the bounds from [24] , which yield the best classical cheating probability P C d = 1 − √ P ab for our protocol (see Appendix VI). The three conditions may then be translated into the following system of equations, where we define Fig. 2 shows a choice of parameters for which system (4) is satisfied, up to a distance of d km.
Discussion.-By noticing a non-trivial connection between the early protocol from [13] and linear optical transformations, we answer the question of the imple-mentability of quantum weak coin flipping, and show that it is achievable with current technology over a few hundred meters. As the distance increases, the issue of stability of the interferometric setup should also be taken into account. Both parties require a set of beam splitters and single photon threshold detectors. State generation on Alice's side can be performed with any heralded probabilistic single-photon source, for which photon indistinguishability and state purity do not matter. Only Alice requires an optical switch, which is commercially available. Although short-term quantum storage is needed, a spool of optical fiber with twice the length of the quantum channel suffices, and provides the required storage/retrieval efficiency.
On the fundamental level, our results also raise the question of a potentially deeper connection between the large family of protocols from [10, 14, 15 ]-which achieves biases as low as 1/6-and linear optics. Recalling that the protocol from [13] , and hence our protocol, is conjectured optimal for this family, its extension to many rounds should be necessary in order to lower the bias. The optimality of the oneround protocol is crucial, as a recent result shows that the WCF bias decreases very inefficiently with the number of rounds [25] .
Appendix
In this appendix, we give detailed proofs of the results presented in the main text. Section I contains preliminary technical results. In Section II, we provide the security analysis for dishonest Alice. In Section III, we show how an unbalanced version of our WCF protocol may yield a SCF protocol. In Section IV we derive the completeness of the protocol in the lossy case, and in Section V, we extend the security analysis to the case of a lossy protocol. In Section VI we solve the system in Eq. (4) of the main text, and derive the constraints that the parameters of the protocol must satisfy in order to obtain a fair and balanced protocol which still outperforms all classical WCF protocols in the lossy case. Finally, in Section VII, we display the practical performance of our fair and balanced protocol for various detection efficiencies.
I. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Single photons are obtained by the action of the creation operator onto the vacuum. Beam splitters act linearly on creation operators, and leave invariant the vacuum. More precisely, a beam splitter of reflectivity t acting on modes k, l maps the creation operatorsâ
where
In the following, we make use of a simple reduction which allows to simplify calculations in the proofs:
For all density matrices τ ,
, and R(π) a phase shift of π acting on mode 2.
Proof. The action of U on the creation operators is given by
Linear interferometers map product coherent states onto product coherent states, and, for all α ∈ C, we have that
We have V = (1 ⊗ H (b) )(H (a) ⊗ 1)(1 ⊗ R(π) ⊗ 1), with a, b ∈ [0, 1], and R(π) a phase shift of π acting on mode 2. The action of V on the creation operators is given by
For all α ∈ C,
Since a = y(1−z)
where we used the completeness relation of coherent states 1 = 1 π C |α α| d 2 α.
We also recall a useful simple property, which we will use extensively in the following:
Lemma 2. Equal losses on various modes can be commuted through passive linear optical elements acting on these modes.
This result was proven, e.g., in [26] , and we give hereafter a quick proof for completeness.
Proof. One way to prove this statement is to use the fact that any interferometer may be decomposed as beam splitters and phase shifters [27] . Then, losses trivially commute with phase shifters, and are easily shown to commute with beam splitters. Indeed, consider a beam splitter of reflectivity t acting on modes 1 and 2. Its action on the creation operators of the modes is given bŷ
while equal losses η on both modes act asâ †
Hence, the action of the beam splitter followed by losses is given bŷ
while losses followed by the beam splitter act aŝ
which is equal to the previous evolution.
In what follows, we let the parameters x, y, z vary freely, and derive the relation these parameters need to satisfy to enforce a honest protocol without abort cases. As presented in the main text, when both parties are honest ( Fig. 1) , the evolution of the quantum state over the three modes up to Bob's first measurement reads:
where the notation (t), kl indicates the reflectivity of the beam splitter and the corresponding spatial modes. Hence, the probability that Bob obtains outcome c = 1 when measuring the third register is P (1) = (1−x)(1−y), while the probability of outcome c = 0 is P (0) = 1 − P (1).
If Bob registers the outcome c = 1, then the post-measurement state on Alice's side is |0 , which will always pass the verification step.
If Bob registers the outcome c = 0, then the post-measurement state reads:
The value of the parameter z should be fixed to
so that this state passes the verification step, and that the protocol doesn't abort in the honest case. We assume this relation holds in the following. In that case, the winning probabilities of Alice and Bob in the honest case are given by
The protocol is fair when (1 − x)(1 − y) = 1 2 . In that case, y = 1 − 1 2(1−x) and z = 2x. Let us also recall from the main text that in the general case, the winning probability of dishonest Bob is given by
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR DISHONEST ALICE WITHOUT LOSSES

A. Bob has number-resolving detectors
When using number-resolving single-photon detectors, any projection onto the n > 1 photon subspace leads to Alice getting caught cheating. Alice must therefore maximize the overlap with the projective measurement |100 100| only (Fig. 3 ). Let σ be the state sent by Alice. Let U = (H (z) ⊗1)(1⊗H (y) ), with z = x 1−(1−x)(1−y) . Alice needs to maximize the probability of the overall outcome (1, 0, 0), which is given by
since Bob uses number-resolving detectors. By convexity of the probabilities, we may assume without loss of generality that Alice sends a pure state σ = |ψ ψ|, which allows us to write: We have:
and therefore:
Substituting back into Eq. (23) then reduces to:
Using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality then allows to upper bound P (A) d as:
which is maximized for ψ = 1. Hence we finally get:
In order to find Alice's optimal cheating strategy (i.e. the optimal pure state |φ that she must send to achieve this bound), we remark that the unnormalized state √ z |10 + y(1 − z) |01 maximizes the expression in Eq. (27) . Normalizing this state then provides Alice's optimal strategy, which is to prepare the state
Hence,
In the case of a fair protocol, y = 1 − 1 2(1−x) and z = 2x, so
and Alice's optimal strategy is to prepare the state
B. Bob has threshold detectors
Unlike the previous case, incorrect outcomes with higher photon number could still pass the test: for n ≥ 1, the threshold detectors cannot discriminate between a |100 and |n00 projection. We show in the following that this doesn't help a dishonest Alice, and that the strategy described previously for the case of number resolving detectors is still optimal in the case of threshold detectors.
With the same notations as in the previous proof, Alice needs to maximize the probability of the overall outcome (1, 0, 0), hence the overlap with the projector ∞ n=1 |n00 n00| = (1 − |0 0|) ⊗ |00 00|. This allows us to write:
. Linear optical evolution conserves photon number. Hence if Alice sends the vacuum state, the detectors will never click. Removing the two-mode vacuum component of the state prepared by Alice and renormalizing therefore always increases her winning probability. Since we are looking for the maximum winning probability, we can assume without loss of generality that ψ|00 = 0, i.e.
So maximizing the winning probability in Eq. (33) is equivalent to maximizing
given the constraint ψ|00 = 0. We havẽ
With Lemma 1 and Eq. (36), we may thus write:
Let us now define:
The constraints ψ|00 = 0 and ψ a |00 = 0 are equivalent, because the above transformation leaves the total number of photons invariant. With Eq. (37) we obtaiñ
with the constraint ψ a |00 = 0. Maximizing this expression thus corresponds to maximizing the probability of the outcome (0, 0) when measuring modes 1 and 3 of the state obtain by mixing the second half of |ψ a with the vacuum on a beam splitter of reflectivity b = 1 − (1 − y)(1 − z) (Fig. 4 ).
FIG. 4:
Equivalent picture for dishonest Alice. In the original dishonest setup of Fig. 3 , Alice aims to maximize the outcome (1, 0, 0). This is equivalent to Alice maximizing outcome 0 on spatial modes 1 and 3, independently of what is detected on mode 2. The outcomes indicated correspond to Alice winning. The
We now show that an optimal strategy for Alice is to ensure that |ψ a = |01 . Let us write
where we take into account the constraint ψ x |00 = 0. Then, with Eq. (39) we obtaiñ
where we used in the fourth line the fact that H (b) doesn't change the number of photons. Since b ∈ [0, 1], this shows thatP
since |ψ a is normalized, and this bound is reached for |ψ 01 | 2 = 1, i.e. |ψ a = |01 . With Eq. (38), this implies that an optimal strategy for Alice is to prepare the state
where |φ is the state that dishonest Alice needs to send to maximize her winning probability when Bob uses number-resolving detectors (Eq. (29)). Her winning probability is then
We therefore recover the same result as for number-resolving detectors. Once again, if the protocol is fair then y = 1 − 1 2(1−x) and z = 2x, so
and an optimal strategy for Alice is to prepare the state
III. QUANTUM SCF PROTOCOL
An unbalanced quantum WCF protocol can be turned into a quantum SCF protocol using an additional classical protocol, as described in [7] . In particular, let us consider a WCF protocol such that:
for p ∈ [0, 1] and > 0. Then, the corresponding SCF protocol has bias [7] 
For our WCF protocol, we have Eqs. (20) , (21) and (44):
with the constraint z = x 1−(1−x)(1−y) (so that the protocol does not abort in the honest case, Eq. (19)). Enforcing the conditions in Eq. (47), and optimizing over the corresponding SCF bias implies
which in turn give the values
by enforcing x, y, z ∈ [0, 1], and a bias of ≈ 0.31, which is a lower bias than the best implemented SCF protocol so far [20] .
IV. CORRECTNESS, WITH LOSSES
We give a representation of the honest protocol with losses, in Fig The honest winning probability for Bob is directly given by his chance of detecting the photon (the photon gets to his detector and doesn't get lost):
On the other hand, Alice wins if the photon, starting from her first input mode, is detected by Bob in the last step. 
Finally, the protocol aborts for all other detection events:
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR DISHONEST ALICE, WITH LOSSES
The losses η correspond to a probability 1 − η of losing a photon. These can be modelled as a mixing with the vacuum on a beam splitter of reflectivity η. Dishonest Bob wins with probability
by performing the same attack as in the lossless case, since he has no control over Alice's laboratory. In what follows, we provide the security analysis for Dishonest Alice.
A. Lossy delay line
We show in this section that Alice's maximum winning probability when Bob is using a delay line of efficiency η f is always lower than when Bob's delay line is perfect, i.e. η f = 1, independently of the efficiency η d of his detectors. The lossy delay line of efficiency η f may be modelled as a mixing with the vacuum on a beam splitter of transmission η f .
Alice prepares a state σ, which goes through the interferometer depicted in Fig. 6 , and wins if the measurement outcome obtained by Bob is (1, 0, 0). In particular, note that the outcome 0 must be obtained for the third mode. Hence Alice's winning probability is always lower than if the third mode was mixed with the vacuum on a beam splitter of transmission amplitude η f just before the detection (Fig. 7) , since this increases the probability of the outcome 0 for this mode. Let us assume that this is the case. Then, by Lemma 2, the losses η f on output modes 2 and 3 may be commuted back through the beam splitter of reflectivity y, acting on modes 2 and 3. Since the input state on mode 3 is the vacuum, the losses on this mode may then be removed (Fig. 8) . In that case, the probability of winning is clearly lower than when the delay line is perfect ( Fig. 9 ), because Alice is now restricted to lossy state preparation instead of ideal state preparation.
This reduction shows that Alice's maximum winning probability when Bob is using a lossy delay line is always lower than when Bob's delay line is perfect, independently of the efficiency η d of his detectors.
Moreover, Alice's maximum cheating probability and optimal cheating strategy may be inferred from the case where Bob has a perfect delay line, as we show in what follows. By convexity of the probabilities, Alice's best strategy is to send a pure state |ψ = k,l 0 ψ kl |kl . Let us denote by W the interferometer depicted in Fig. 6 , including the detection losses. Let us consider the evolution of Alice's state and the vacuum on the third input mode through the interferometer W . The creation operator for the first mode evolves aŝ
while the creation operator for the second mode evolves aŝ
Hence, the output state (before the ideal threshold detection) is given by
(59) Now Alice's maximum cheating probability is given by
Hence, the state after a successful projection (1 − |0 0|) |00 00|, which has norm P
When Bob has a perfect delay line (η f = 1) this state reads
and its norm is the winning probability of Alice in that case. Hence,
i.e. we can obtain Alice's cheating probability by solving the case with perfect delay line, and replacing the parameter y by yη f . In the following, we thus derive Alice's optimal strategy in that case.
B. Perfect delay line
Let σ be the state sent by Alice, and η d the detector efficiency. She needs to maximize the probability of the overall outcome (1, 0, 0) at the output of the interferometer depicted in Fig. 10 , hence the overlap with the projector:
By convexity of the probabilities, we may assume without loss of generality that Alice sends a pure state σ = |ψ ψ|. Moreover, the imperfect threshold detectors of quantum efficiency η d can be modelled by mixing the state to be measured with the vacuum on a beam splitter of transmission amplitude η d followed by an ideal threshold detection [28] . In that case, this corresponds to losses η d on modes 1, 2, and 3, followed by ideal threshold detections. By Lemma 2, commuting the losses back through the interferometer leads to the equivalent picture depicted in Fig. 11 , where the losses on input mode 3 have been omitted, since the input state is the vacuum.
In that case, Alice's probability of winning is clearly lower than when the threshold detectors are perfect ( Fig. 3) , because she is restricted to lossy state preparation instead of ideal state preparation. Let |ψ be the lossy state obtained by applying losses η d on both modes of Alice's prepared state |ψ . Alice's winning probability may then be written:
where U = (H (z) ⊗ 1)(1 ⊗ H (y) ) is the unitary corresponding to the general interferometer of the lossless protocol. By Lemma 1, we have
for any density matrix τ , where V = (1 ⊗ H (b) )(H (a) ⊗ 1)(1 ⊗ R(π) ⊗ 1), with a = y(1−z) y+z−yz and b = y + z − yz, and R(π) a phase shift of π acting on mode 2. Hence,
where we used U † |000 = |000 for the second term. Setting |ψ x = (H (a) ⊗ 1)(1 ⊗ R(π)) |ψ yields
where we used |00 = (1 ⊗ R(π))H (a) |00 for the second term P 2 . Let us consider the first term P 1 . Since |ψ is the state obtained by applying losses η d on both modes of the state |ψ , we obtain the equivalent picture in Fig. 12 , where we have added losses η d also on mode 3, since the input state is the vacuum.
Let |ψ x = H (a) (1 ⊗ R(π)) |ψ . With Lemma 2, commuting the losses η d to the output of the interferometer in Fig. 12 , and combining the losses on mode 2 and 3 yields
where Π η (0) is the POVM element corresponding to no click for a threshold detector of quantum efficiency η (recall that this is the same as an ideal detector preceded by a mixing with the vacuum on a beam splitter of transmission amplitude η). The same reasoning for the second term P 2 gives
and we finally obtain with Eq. (68), 
where we used b = y + z − yz. Let l 0 ∈ N * such that max l 1
. This last expression is an upperbound for P (A) d , which is attained for ψ kl = δ k,0 δ l,l0 , i.e. |ψ x = |0l 0 . Thus, the best strategy for Alice is to send the state |ψ = (1 ⊗ R(π))H (a) |ψ x = (1 ⊗ R(π))H (a) |0l 0 ,
where a = y(1−z) y+z−yz , and her winning probability is then
when Bob has a perfect delay line. Recalling Eq. (63), the best strategy for Alice when Bob has a lossy delay line of efficiency η f is to send the state |ψ = (1 ⊗ R(π))H (a) |ψ x = (1 ⊗ R(π))H (a) |0l 1 ,
where a = y(1−z)η f yη f +z−yzη f , and l 1 ∈ N * maximizes (1 − η d (1 − yη f )(1 − z)) l − (1 − η d ) l . Her winning probability is then
and this last expression is the winning probability when there are no losses.
Let us derive the value of l 1 . For this, we define:
FIG. 13: Parameters η d = 0.95 and z = 0.57. Note that honest abort probability P ab is plotted in magenta.
FIG. 14:
Parameters η d = 0.90 and z = 0.63. Note that honest abort probability has been omitted in order to zoom in, but it lies around 0.15 for these distances.
